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plete and more complicated statute.5 The result is a desirable one.
Taxation is a practical matter, and the common law theory that a right
is extinguished and nothing transferred should not prevail when the
actual result is that the survivor has an exclusive ownership where
Bmrvm GmriurT
formerly he shared it.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXERCISE OF THE GOVERNOR'S VETO
OF AN ACCOMPANYING MESSAGE.-NECESSITY
ARNETT v. MEREDITH.
The Kentucky Legislature passed an act' which was sent to the
governor for his approval. He wrote on the bill these words: "This bill
is hereby vetoed." The attorney-general, believing the governor had not
legally exercised his right of veto, demanded a copy of the act from the
secretary of state. The request was refused and a declaratory judgment
action was filed to compel delivery of the act to the public printer.
The lower court sustained the plaintiff's petition, holding that the
governor had failed to legally exercise his veto power in not assigning
his reasons for vetoing the bill. Defendant appealed. Held: Judgment
affirmed. A veto message of the governor is not complete, therefore
1 Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497 (1930) (tenancy by entirety created
after passage of act taxable); Phillips v. Dime Trust & S. D. Co.,
284 U. S. 160 (1931), noted 32 Col. L. Rev. 148 (1932) (tenancy by
entirety created after passage of first act but before existing one taxable); Gwinn v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 287 U. S. 224 (1932), noted
21 Calif. L. Rev. 286 (1933) (Joint estate created before passage of any
act taxable); Griswald v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 56 (1933), noted 32
Mich. L. Rev. $68 (1934) (joint estate created before passage of act
taxable); U. S. v. Robertson, 183 Fed. 711 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910) (tenancy
by entirety created after passage of act taxable); Third Nat. Bank &
Trust Co. v. White, 45 F. (2d) 911 (1930), aff'd 287 U. S. 577 (1932),
noted 46 Harv. L. Rev. 718 (1933) (entire value of property held in
tenancy by entirety created before passage of any act taxable);
O'Shaughnessy v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 60 F. (2d) 235 (1932,
C. C. A. 6th) (entire estate created after passage of first act but before
existing one taxable. This ease is interesting in connection with the
principal case because it arose in Ky. and involves our statutes on
joint tenancy); White v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 64 F. (2d) 119
(C. C. A. 8th, 1933) (joint estate created before passage of act taxable);
Putnam v. Burnett, 63 F. (2d) 457 (Ct. of App., D. of C., 1933) (tenancy
by entirety created before passage of any act taxable); Robinson v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev., 63 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) (same);
Clarke v. Welch, 7 F. Supp. 595 (S. D. Calif., 1933) (entire value of
joint estate taxable); Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F. (2d) 548 (Ct. of
App., D. of C., 1935) (amount contributed by survivor determined of
amount taxable); Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56 (F. D. N. Y., 1937)
(entire value of joint estate taxable); Foster v. Commissioner of Int.
Rev., 90 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) (same); Sheets v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 95 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (no consideration given so whole joint estate taxable).
"Acts, 1938, c. 275, amending and re-enacting Section 551 of Ky.
Stat. (Carroll, 1936), which is a part of the chapter dealing with
private corporations.
For text of the statute as amended, see Baldwin's Ky. Stat. Supp.,
May, 1938, c. 32, Section 551.

CASE COMMENTS
illegal and ineffective, when he fails to accompany his veto with a
message giving his reasons for the veto. Arnett v. Meredith, 275 Ky.
223, 121 S. W. (2d) 36 (1938).
The court spent much time in laying a foundation for its holding.
The basis was that the exercise of the veto power by the governor is
a legislative act which is an encroachment by the executive upon the
legislative powers and that, as such, it must be in strict accordance with
the terms of the instrument granting the power and allowing the
encroachment. The court could have simplified matters by merely
stating that the Kentucky Constitution provides, in unambiguous terms,
that the bill shall be returned with the governor's objections to the
house in which it originated, and, in case of adjournment preventing a
return to the legislature, the veto message shall be spread upon the
register of the secretary of state.2
One reason given for requiring the governor to accompany the veto
with his objections and grounds therefor, is that the framers of the
Constitution intended such message to be a guide for the legislature in
reconsidering the bill. The legislature might amend the bill so as to
make it acceptable to the governor, or, if the reason seems unsound,
might, after reconsideration, pass the bill over the veto of the governor.'
The veto power so given by the Kentucky Constitution is a qualified,
not an absolute, power. Therefore, the legislature is entitled to know
the reasons so it may take further action on the bill if the members so
desire.
The Kentucky Court sets forth a further reason for the rule which
Is of unquestionable validity. This secondary reason is that the public
generally, as well as members of the legislature, have the right to know
why the governor vetoed an act.4 The right is given them, says the
Ky. Constitution 1892, Section 88.
"Every bill which shall have passed the two houses shall be presented to the governor. If he approve he shall sign it; but if not, he
shall return it with his objections to the house in which it originated,
which shall enter the objections in full upon its journal, and proceed
to reconsider it .... If any bill shall not be returned by the governor
within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented
to him, it shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless
the General Assembly by their adjournment, prevent its return, in
which case it shall be a law, unless disapproved by him within ten
days after the adjournment, in which case his veto message shall be
spread upon the register kept by the secretary of state. . .
See also: Ky. Constitution 1892, Sections 27 and 28.
For a good discussion of historical background pertaining to the
executive veto power, see: State ex rel. Boynton v. French, 133 Kan.
579, 300 P. 1082 (1931), esp. at pp. 1083, 1084.
The Ky. court's additional reason would have more strength in
a state such as Arkansas, where, under the state Constitution, the
governor's veto and objections must be given public proclamation.
(Ark. Const. 1874, Art- 6, Section 15. Pope's Dig. of Ark. Stat. 1937.)
However, Arkansas has held a mere filing of the vetoed bill with
the secretary of state for entry upon his register, to be a sufficient
public proclamation. (Dickinson v. Page, 120 Ark. 377; 179 S. W. 1004
(1915).
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court, so that they may exercise their rights and powers as voters in
electing a governor who will act conscientiously in the exercise of his
powers.
The result in the case is desirable since it places responsibility for
the failure to enact a law on the person who causes that failure. Such
placing of responsibility for failure of an act gives the people an opportunity to take corrective steps. 6 Further, this requirement of reasons
serves to inform the public as to why a particular bill was vetoed by
their governor. In cases where non-legislative bodies have opportunity
to exercise vital powers, the public should be allowed, in all fairness,
to hear the reasons why this vital power was so exercised.
Of course, after the governor has once given his reasons for a
veto the court should not attempt to pass upon the validity of such
objections but should leave the merits to be considered by the legislature.' For a court to pass upon the substance of objections accompanying a veto would be an example of encroachment by the judiciary
upon the functions of the executive.
JoHN L. YOUNG
EQUITABLE SERVITUDES-TERMINATION-CHANGE
NEIGHBORHOOD

IN

Deeds to lots in a certain subdivision contained restrictive
covenants as to character and minimum cost of residences which might
be erected thereon. Since the establishment of the subdivision, a number of business houses had been erected there, and the city zoning
commission had declared the subdivision to be a business district. The
plaintiff lumber company acquired a lot adjoining defendant's garage
and asserted its right to erect thereon a business house. Defendant
denied that right because of the restrictive conditions mentioned.
r In the principal case the attempt to exercise the veto power was
made after the adjournment of the legislature. Conceding that the
statement by the court in the Arnett case, that the reasons must be
given in case of a veto while the legislature is in session, is mere
dictum (Arnett v. Meredith, 275 Ky. 223, at p. 231), yet there would
seem to be no ground upon which a rational distinction could be made
in cases where the legislature is in session. The same reasons for
requiring an accompanying message exist, without regard to whether
the legislature is in session or adjourned.
"Whether the exercise of the "power to disapprove any part or
parts of appropriation bills embracing distinct items" (Ky. Const.,
Sec. 88) will require an accompanying message containing reasons
therefor will depend upon the court's construction of See. 88 in its
entirety. One case intimates that a part or parts of an appropriation
bill embracing distinct items could be vetoed by a mere notation of the
fact of veto without any reasons. (Dickinson v. Page, 120 Ark. 377,
179 S. W. 1004 (1915). However, if the reason for the rule is sound,
then there is no valid ground for relaxing the rule when applying it
to parts of an appropriation bill as contrasted with the veto of a bill
in toto. (See the dissenting opinion in the Dickinson case, 179 S. W.
1004, at p. 1007.)
7 Birdsall v. Carrick, 3-4 Nev. Rep. (Hawley's Republication) 138
(1867). See esp. p. 141 of the opinion.

